CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS AND ABSTRACTS
Such a formula would seem to combine the objective and subjective approaches to produce a result which is both reasonable and equitable.
A brief summary of the application of this analysis to several situations may be helpful in testing its validity. In the first situation to be considered, the crime is continuing on the basis of application of an objective standard, and the defendant enters with intent to aid in its completion. However, if intent is not clear, then the rebuttable presumption of intent is raised. This situation is, of course, the one involved in the Zierlion case, and the reader will recall that here the late joiner should be guilty as a principal.
The second illustration is the Baker case in which the defendant entered before the crime was completed but with intent only to aid the criminal to escape. An application of an objective analysis would raise a presumption of intent which could be rebutted. If rebutted, the joiner could be convicted neither as a principal nor as an accessory to the major crime. Prosecution as a principal would be ineffective because the necessary intent to aid the major crime is not present; and prosecution as an accessory would be equally ineffective since the activities of the defendant took place before the crime was consummated. 46 
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Of what crime, then, could Baker have been convicted? It has been suggested that conviction could be sought on the basis of the theory that this individual was an accessory to a lesser crime included in the greater crime of manslaughter, i.e., accessory after the fact of assault with intent to murder. Comment, 32 MrNN. L. REv. 502 (1948) . Such a conviction was upheld in People v. Haskins, 337 Ill. 131, 169 N.E. 18 (1929) . Thus, in the final analysis Baker would be punished to the same extent to which he would have been, had he been determined an accessory after the fact of murder.
The third example is a case in which the crime is found to have been completed on the basis of objective analysis, but the joiner enters with intent to aid in the major crime. Since the formula developed requires a concurrence of the objective and subjective factors, the defendant in this situation would be guilty as an accessory.
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The final possibility relates to a case in which the crime is complete and the intent of the joiner is to aid the principal in escape. Here, the presumption formula is inapplicable since it is clearly the situation contemplated by accessory after the fact statutes.
This suggests a question as to whether, contrary to present legislation, a different punishment should be statutorily prescribed for accessories after the fact of different crimes. Such a distinction would involve the problem of attempting to draw fine lines in relation to punishment. For example, the punishment in Illinois for an accessory after the fact is ". . . imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not less than one year and not exceeding two years, and fined not exceeding $5002' IL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 38, §584 (1959) . The judge or jury could, as they now do, set the punishment within the statute to fit their concept of the seriousness of the offense. This would seem preferable to an inflexible statutory amendment.
An additional legislative solution has been advanced in relation to establishment of a new class of crime to cover situations such as the Baker case. Comment, 32 MnN. L. REv. 502 (1948) . It would be more desirable, however, to convict as an accessory after the fact and set the punishment to suit the crime within the statutory limits. Possibly, the penalty for such a violation should be more severe than presently provided in accessory after the fact statutes, but this is a moral rather than a legal determination. In addition, such situations seem to arise so infrequently that additional legislation may not be justified.
47As previously indicated this is consistent with the legal requirement of some participation in the major crime. Note 38, supra. Generally, these statutes are patterned after the model act drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
CASE NOTE
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The Uniform Act provides for the following procedure: A certificate is filed by a judge in the requesting state with a judge in the state where the witness may be found. The certificate must show that a criminal prosecution is pending in the requesting state or that a grand jury investigation has commenced, or is about to commence, and that the person sought is a material witness. In addition the certificate must state the number of days the witness' presence will be required. If the judge with whom the petition is filed finds that the certificate is proper, he may order the witness before him in one of two ways:
1.) He may set a time and a place for a hearing and order the witness to appear. After the hearing, a summons may be issued directing the witness to attend and testify in the outof-state proceeding. 2.) He may direct that the witness be immediately brought before him for a hearing.
After the hearing the judge may order that the witness be taken into custody and delivered to an officer of the requesting state. This procedure is followed, when recommended by the requesting state, so as to assure the witness' attendance in that state. Under either procedure, the hearing and issues to be determined are the same.
The judge must determine whether the witness is material and necessary to the criminal proceeding, whether his attendance will cause him undue hardship, and whether the requesting state, and any state through which the witness will travel, will grant him immunity from arrest and the service of civil and criminal process. (1957) .
The statute also provides that the witness will be paid ten cents a mile to and from the court where the prosecution is pending, and five dollars a day for each day he is required to travel and serve as a witness. The requesting state is obligated to pay the witness, provided he is a witness for the state. This provision of the Uniform Act does not entitle a defendant to have witnesses brought into court at public expense. State v. Blount, 200 Or. 35, 264 P.2d 419 (1953) The dissenting opinion, however, bases its reasoning upon the Extradition Clause of the Constitution.
4 They claim that a state cannot expand its power of extradition to cover witnesses when the scope of such power is specifically limited to fugitives."'
The dissent further argues that Congress has preempted the area of extradition since it has enacted legislation making it a federal crime for a person to move in interstate commerce "to avoid giving testimony" in certain felony proceedings. 6 Basing their reasoning upon the supremacy clause they conclude that, should the power of extradition be expanded to include witnesses, additional Congressional action would be needed.
Congress, however, has not enacted a statute authorizing the extradition of a person charged "Restatement, Conflict of Laws, §94 (1934) . "A state can exercise jurisdiction through its courts to make a decree directing a party subject to the jurisdiction of the court to do an act in another state, provided such act is not contrary to the law of the state in which it is to be performed." Contra, 72 C.J.S. Process §8 (1951), 4 Am. JuR. Arrest §19 (1936). Passet v. Chase, 91 Fla. 522, 107 So. 689 (1926) .
3 See supra note 10, at 5. 4 See supra note 10, at 14. [Vol. 51 with a crime who was not present in the charging state when the crime was committed. To cover this area, forty-one states have enacted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.
1 7 Various state courts have held the Act constitutional as within the reserved powers of the states and as an act of comity with sister states.
8
Congress also has not provided a procedure whereby a state may request the attendance of an out-of-state witness. By analogy to the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, the states through the exercise of their reserved powers may provide a procedure for the surrender of witnesses to other states whenever they are necessary for the successful enforcement of criminal law.
The apparent logic of this argument might fail when the soundness of comparing a witness with one charged with a crime is questioned. The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act merely expands the existing constitutional provision for the extradition of persons charged with a crime. The Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses, however, expands the states' powers of extradition to include not only persons accused of a crime but also the witnesses needed to prosecute such accused persons. Where the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act is based upon the extradition clause of the constitution, there is no constitutional provision which provides for the extradition of witnesses. This dilemma is resolved in that the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses is based on the reserved powers of the states rather than on the extradition clause of the constitution.
The interpretation of the "Privileges and Immunities" clause was also involved in the O'Neill 17 UuiroaR CRnAL ExmADrioN AcT § §1-31. IsEnnist v. Baden, 6 Fla. Supp. 183, 28 So. 2d 160 (1946); State v. Kriss, 191 Md. 568, 62 A.2d 568 (1948) ; Ex parte Bledsoe, 93 Okla. Crim. 302, 227 P.2d 680 (1951) Although the O'Neill case dealt primarily with the constitutionality of the Uniform Act, application of the Act also presents non-constitutional questions of policy and interpretation.
The advantages of the Act can only be maintained when its procedural requirements are strictly followed. The most important requirements of the Act are that the witness is material and necessary, that his attendance will not cause him undue hardship, and that states to which or through which he travels will grant him immunity from arrest or service of process. The immunity requirement does not raise severe problems. The other requirements, however, cause more difficulty. For example:
(1) Suppose that a request is made by an Illinois court upon an Indiana court requesting the procurement of a key witness for an Illinois murder prosecution. Provided that the court is satisfied with the requirements of maeriality and necessity,n it must also decide that the attendance of the witness will not cause him undue hardship. The court may satisfy this requirement by a careful examination of the nature of the pending prosecution and the amount of hardship placed on the individual witness. In a situation similar to the hypothetical, the court might find, and rightly so, compacts for cooperative effort and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime and in the enforcement of their respective criminal laws and policies, and to establish such agencies, joint or otherwise, as they may deem desirable for making effective such agreements and compacts." 21 See supra note 10, at 6. 22 See supra note 4 for discussion of problems involved in determining "materiality and necessity".
